'First Home Buyers priced out of Sydney market', 'RBA considers lending constraints on property', 'Rundown shack sells for $1m over reserve' - these are the headlines of nearly every Australian daily newspaper commenting on the residential property boom currently taking place in Australia, and Sydney in particular. Many reasons are cited for the price appreciation in $A terms, but very few commentators have bothered to look at the exchange rate. The $A has declined over 47% against the Chinese Yuan since June 2011, making Australian property much cheaper from a Chinese investor's standpoint...
The picture below, in fact, shows that Sydney residential property prices are still well below their peak from a Chinese Yuan perspective versus the peak in the AUDCNY exchange rate in June 2011. The blue line is the performance of the Sydney Residential Property index in $A (courtesy of the ABS) while the red line is the same index expressed in Chinese Yuan. The red dot bases both series at 100 corresponding to the peak in the $A. The diagram shows that while Sydney property has risen 38% since June 2011, this has not been sufficient to offset the 47% decline in the $A against the Yuan.
Chinese investors who bought Sydney property in 2011 have lost money, as have those who bought property as recently as December 2014! The flipside is that Sydney property is actually cheaper than it was in June 2011 for Chinese investors looking to park some of their stockmarket profits in Australian property. On this basis, Sydney property is going up so long as the $A remains weak.
The Reserve Bank of Australia should take careful note of this for two reasons. First and foremost, THERE IS NO BUBBLE IN AUSTRALIAN PROPERTY. Foreign investors view Australia as a cheaper and cheapening investment venue. Second, the RBA is partially to blame for promoting a weak $A which in turn has created strong offshore demand for property, driving up domestic prices. If they truly want to arrest the climb in Australian property domestically, they should take steps to strengthen the $A.
We have been loathe to comment on the Greek pantomime for the last 2 or 3 weeks since, as this blog noted way back on June 22, the debt negotiations had everything to do with politics and nothing to do with Finance nor Economics. We are not political scientists. Now that the current Greek chapter is pretty much a wrap, it is nevertheless worth reflecting on what has transpired.
The debt negotiations were ambling along quite nicely from a political standpoint while the June 30 debt payment seemed to be the deadline for a short-term compromise that would suit all parties and relegate the issue back to P38 of the Financial Times. This all got derailed when Mr Tsipras, on June 25, decided to call a referendum to gauge the opinion of the Greek people, who on July 5 rejected the EU/ECB/IMF proposed debt extension conditions.
At the time, the referendum result was hailed by many as an act of political genius. But, Oh dear, Mr Tsipras had only managed to make a lot of powerful people very angry. The delicate balancing act of negotiating among 22 member states had been jack-knifed by Tsipras who decided to put the question to his people. The EU's leaders viewed this as far more of a threat to their governing process than losing a couple of hundred billion Euro by kicking Greece out of the club. Imagine what a mess the EU would be if every government decided to hold a referendum on any issue that they disagreed with? The EU powers that be had to stop this in its tracks! So they decided to kick him out unless he agreed to their conditions.
And so Tsipras found himself politically weakened, despite his democratic mandate, simply because he stepped outside the political rules. His government is in mutiny and he now has to appeal to the conservative opposition to pass the legislation needed to remain in the EU. Worse still, his grip on power appears tenuous and new elections may have to be called where he will suffer a humiliating defeat. 7 days after being hailed as a 'political genius', he now looks like a 'political dunce'.
The moral to the story: Democracy has no role to play in EU politics.
Risk aversion is a powerful force. Risk aversion is a subjective feeling that investors use to assess their preference for cash over risky assets. Risk aversion can change quickly and affect markets quite broadly. These are temporary effects that can be exploited for profit.
On the face of it, Greece's negotiations with their creditors are minor relative to the global markets. GDP is about USD250 billion versus USD250 Trillion for the Global Market Capitalisation - about 1/1000th. Wiping out Greece entirely should have little effect on global wealth, not that this is going to happen, nor anything close to it.
Yet the headlines in the financial press foreshadowed crisis and the Global stock markets fell around 2%. How can this be? If the total risk to global wealth from a Greek collapse is far less than 0.1%, why do stock markets write-off 2% of wealth?
The reason is that investors suddenly view cash in a new light, a safe haven, and they revise their attitude to risk-taking away from markets and into cash. In short, the Greek experience triggers a 'Risk Aversion Shock' and the broad markets fall, regardless of the 'fundamentals' as given by the effects on future profits and cash flows from Greece itself.
Like all sudden jumps in risk aversion, this shock is temporary and the markets will recover pretty quickly. In the meantime, there is profit to be made by investors selling cash to those who suddenly decide they need it.
"We propose a rationalisation of Greece’s debt repayment schedule along the following lines. First, to effect an SMP BUY-BACK Greece acquires a new loan from the ESM, then purchases the SMP bonds back from the ECB and retires them." Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis June 18 2015
Few bankers like to take a haircut on a bad loan, but most will in otherwise hopeless circumstances. No banker, however, will lend to the debtor to facilitate repurchasing their debt at a discount.
To be honest, the Greek Finance Minister has a good idea. With Greek Debt trading at 50c in the Euro, why not just buy it back cheap and retire it? He should be doing this every day that he can, in fact. One Euro spent buying back 2 Euros worth of debt is money much better spent than on pensions or trips to Brussels...
...but to ask your creditors to lend you the money to buy back the debt??? Precocious? Maybe. An amateur? Definitely.
What we are witnessing in the negotiations between the EU/ECB/IMF and Greece has nothing to do with Finance. It is all Politics. And while the markets want a definitive solution as soon as possible, the politicians on all sides are basking in the attention. This is the politicians' moment of international significance, a moment that they all want to last forever.
Governments deal with other Governments differently than they deal with private individuals. Every Government would have no hesitation foreclosing on a company that fails to pay its taxes or indebtedness. Every Government hesitates to do the same to a fellow Sovereign. This is why Greece will not be allowed to default, nor exit the European Union, nor abandon the Euro currency.
The Punch and Judy show occupying the financial press at the present time needs to be put in context. Greece is negotiating with their 'official creditors', namely Government instrumentalities, that have absolute discretion to treat any delayed debt repayment in any way that they choose. Greece may decide to repudiate their debt but its creditors are under no obligation to accept the repudiation - they can forgive, or extend or defer or simply cover the payment themselves. Official creditor nations will be angry, but they are unlikely to ostracise a fellow Sovereign.
Doomsayers postulating imminent 'Grexit' need to start thinking like bureaucrats. There are no lines in the sand, no critical decision dates, nor any pressing timetable as it affects the Greeks' ability to holdout for a better deal. The ECB, the EU and the IMF have no incentive to 'writedown' their debt, nor are they subject to the same accounting standards that apply to the private sector which would otherwise force them to. They just want the problem to recede back onto p38 of the Financial Times...
At some point, there will be a "Peace in our time" declaration, when the Greeks and their official creditors strike a compromise. It is inevitable. It is reality.
While the bond markets in Europe wobble under nervous Greek-inspired sentiment, and now 'reflation concerns', who would have thought that the Euro would appreciate? Surely selling Euro bonds means selling the currency too?
My suspicion is the position unwinds taking place are the 'fully hedged variety', while the purchases are Euro long. The fully hedged trade is to buy, say, Spain and sell the currency exposure. This requires 3 transactions - a bond purchase, a spot Euro purchase and a forward Euro sale, where the last two trades roughly balance off. The Euro long trade has just 2 components - the bond purchase and the spot Euro purchase. It seems that the currency imbalance is reflecting this switch from investors who were hedged to those who are unhedged.
Who could they be? Central Banks and Sovereign Reserves Managers are traditionally unhedged. Hedge funds and relative value investors tend to go fully-hedged. My guess is that CBs are buying the bonds that the Hedge Funds are selling in Europe, driving up the Euro. Longer term, this is good for the European bond market since the new owners are buy-and-hold.
Bonus Uber Footnote
In Singapore, a taxi company charges drivers $125 per day for a standard taxi and $175 for a Mercedes. My Uber driver confided that he was paying $60 to rent his car from an Uber operator, but now leases directly from a car hire company on a monthly basis averaging $46 per day. If, like me, you ever wondered about the economics of Uber, now you know.
A driver saves $79 per day on his fixed costs but sacrifices not being available for street jobs. Uber's role is to attract call jobs by being cheaper than standard taxi booking fees. Simple. I wouldn't want to be a taxi company.
For decades, the economic community has tried to prove whether monetary policy works or not. Scientists have been confounded by the lack of a controlled laboratory experiment and therefore have resorted to econometric analysis, which itself is hindered by stability issues. For instance, the long-held belief that monetary policy operates with a 'long and variable lag' basically negates the statistical evidence up front, no matter what the outcome.
But wait! The US Federal Reserve has kept short rates on hold for the last 6 1/2 years, which as the following diagram shows, is the longest stretch of unchanged interest rates since 1954,
For a statistician, this is manna from heaven! The fact that a critical variable has been constant for such a long period of time should enable researchers to clearly discriminate between movement in prices, employment, gdp etc etc that are unrelated to monetary actions, simply because there have been no monetary actions!
For instance, during the period 2009 to 2015, the US has experienced a recession, a tepid recovery, a robust expansion and, more recently, a nascent slowdown. None of this can be attributable to Fed policy change. The evidence against active monetary policy is mounting every day that the Fed remains on hold...
We are on the verge of finding something really significant, and the longer the Fed does nothing, the more significant the results will be. I therefore have started the Twitter hashtag #FedDoNothing , in the interests of Science, to appeal to the Fed to continue to do what it has been doing since 2009, which is nothing.
Please, join in the #FedDoNothing debate on Twitter and make your voice heard in the interests of Science.
The current retracement in bond markets, a.k.a. "the global bond rout", has awoken the Bond Bears from their embarrassed slumber. Embarrassed, because for years they have been incorrectly calling for lower bond prices, particularly in the US, without much success. The Bears are beginning to chant "we told you so", but it is far too early for them to claim any form of investment superiority…
The following Bloomberg grab tells their sorry story.
This picture shows the total return from investing in US Treasury bonds since 2010 . At the beginning of each of the 5 years from 2010 to the present, Wall Street had predicted higher interest rates and therefore bond market losses. In each of these 5 years, except for 2013, the Bears were wrong. For the five-year period to 2015, investing in Treasuries has produced a cumulative 21.9% return while at the same time remaining in cash would have delivered basically zero.
This is an appalling track record, and any Wall Street expert should reflect on their consistent underperformance before claiming victory in the current 4 week correctuin. If anything, the current sell-off offers them a dignified exit from what has been an horrific loss-making trade.
I did not attend the European Finance Ministers summit in Riga last Friday. Reports, however, chronicle how the Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, gave his European counterparts a lecture in Macro-economics. Specifically, Varoufakis extolled the fantastic way that government spending 'stimulates' the economy, and how his government should be unshackled from debt to spend its way out of recession...
The reports from Riga expose a double-irony.
The first irony is that Varoufakis was preaching to the converted. European governments, in general, are dominated by Keynesians who view government spending as a form of 'stimulus' (ie it makes GDP get bigger). No-one in the room was going to argue that point (despite the facts - its a pity I wasn't there!). His condescending tone, however, managed to turn the room of sympathisers against him.
The second irony is that the Finance Ministers wanted their interest payment. That is, despite their collective belief in the fantasy Macro-stimulus story, they still adhered to the grubby Micro-business of getting paid the coupon on the loan contracts they wrote 4 years ago. Varoufakis's argument that not paying the coupon will be more than multiplied in additional GDP did not resonate. The Finance Ministers wanted their money.
In 2012, the same group of Finance Ministers collectively agreed that "Greece would be better off" if the private sector wore the debt reduction haircut imposed by the PSI, while '"official creditor nations" retained their full entitlements.
When it came to cutting their own hair in Riga last week, so that "Greece would be better off', they baulked. Micro-reality trumped Macro-fantasy where their own money is involved.
One of the fundamentals of finance is that investment markets tend to go up. This is perfectly rational, and indeed necessary to induce capital formation, but conflicts with the fashionable view amongst policymakers that higher asset prices are the product of speculative bubbles.
Singapore's government introduced a combination of credit rationing and transaction taxes over a number of years in order to arrest the increase in property prices that was experienced from 2009 to 2012. The following diagram shows the performance of Singapore's residential property market versus the US, UK, Hong Kong and Australia from January 2013 to December 2014.
The simple point of the picture is that Singapore properly has fallen nearly 5% while other markets, both globally and regionally, have appreciated between 11% and 13%. There are a number of ways to interpret this data.
1. It could be proof that cooling measures actually work to restrain the growth in property prices. On this interpretation, the assumption is that Singapore property should have risen by about 13% over two years in line with other markets. By engineering a 5% decline in property prices over the period, the Singapore government has permanently cut the price of property by 18% relative to where it would otherwise be. Rolling back the cooling measures would have no impact on prices in this scenario.
2. It could be that the 18% difference between Singapore's property and the rest of the world is a form of rationing. Once the cooling measures are lifted, prices would catch-up quickly, but in the meantime rationing leads to resource misallocation, excessive risk-taking and sub-optimal growth.
Which of these interpretations is most likely? As a property owner in Singapore, I regularly receive unsolicited enquiries from random people looking to buy my house for a 'bargain price'. This suggests to me that rationing is dominating - high taxes are keeping transactions low while at the same time there are many buyers ready to swoop on those forced to sell due to lack of access to liquidity. Recorded sale prices are artificially low since they reflect forced sales due to constraints on access to liquidity. Meanwhile, the rest of the market is locked due to taxes.
It is perfectly natural for property markets to rise, as it is for any asset market to show capital appreciation. If Singapore's property market was in a bubble 3 years ago, it certainly isn't now and the impact of the legislative measures is far greater than the -4.75% decline the government points to. Prices are 18% below those of other property markets on a relative basis. By this metric, the Government's job is done and it should be time to stop rationing liquidity...
The immediate effect of relaxing the cooling measures will see trading volume increase and prices rise from their artificially low, rationed levels. This outcome is going to be difficult to swallow since it highlights the shortcomings of the original policy. Policymakers need to go back to their Finance principles and accept the fact that property prices are supposed to rise.
“If financial-market conditions do not tighten much in response to higher short-term interest rates, we might have to move more quickly. In contrast, if financial conditions tighten unduly, then this will likely cause us to go much more slowly or even to pause for a while.” NY Federal Reserve President Dudley, April 6 2015.
At first, this sounds like a reasonable statement. Think twice, and the statement is absurd. If Dudley's comments truly reflect the US Federal Reserve's approach to policy then it is a rudderless, reactive functionary which is afraid to keep the markets informed. Let me elaborate...
First, and foremost, Dudley fails to tell us exactly what the Fed wants. One of the key underpinnings of modern finance is informational efficiency - that is, the ability for financial markets to accurately reflect the fair values of asset prices, instantly and without the necessity for any trading at all. Dudley could easily have said that the Fed's objective, for example, is to see a 1% cash rate in 1 years time and a 3% 10 year bond yield. That would have been something solid that the markets could kick around and digest. But he didn't do that. Instead, he elected to threaten the markets for under/over shooting the Fed's objectives, without telling us what those objectives are. WHAT ARE WE, MIND READERS?
Second, this sounds like experimental, reactive policy rather than a confident, rule based one. "Lets raise rates by 15bp and see what happens...". Surely, someone, somewhere in the Fed has a policy benchmark to measure what their desired effect is going to be? If so, why not tell us?
Or is the Fed just going to raise rates for the sake of it? Because it 'feels right'? If the cart isn't broken, don't fix it.
Its time for some openness and honesty on the part of our policymakers. If they don't know what they are doing, just tell us...
Monetary authorities can control the interest rate or the exchange rate, but not both. 2015 has witnessed a startling array of 'monetary stimulus' measures around the world, with varying degrees of success.
The ECB has acted to aggressively lower interest rates in Europe by buying bonds across the curve. Lower interest rates arguably lead to more real investment. Meanwhile, the Euro exchange rate has depreciated significantly making exports more attractive to foreigners. It would appear that the interest rate and the exchange rate are being nice to the ECB.
Singapore's MAS, conversely, engineered an emergency mid-meeting currency depreciation in January but this has triggered higher domestic interest rates. Fear of further depreciation has caused a capital flight, drying up liquidity. The benefits to Singapore's exporters from a more competitive exchange rate may well be offset by higher investment costs. The Bloomberg grab shows 3mth Tbill yields in Singapore rising while German Tbill yields have fallen.
These two cases stand in stark contrast: both the ECB and the MAS tried to achieve the same outcome, but one failed while the other succeeded. While we can argue the pros and cons of active monetary policy, it must be disconcerting to our policymakers that no matter which lever they pull (interest rates or exchange rates), the other lever is basically unpredictable, and can inflict all sorts of damage...
"First, do no harm" - so starts the hippocratic oath for medical practitioners. What wonderful advice for monetary policymakers this is! As Janet Yellen contemplates raising interest rates in the US for the first time in 7 years, imposing a hypocratic oath on monetary policymakers might be worth considering...
In theory, nominal interest rates are not suppose to be negative. This is because simply stashing cash in the mattress earning nothing dominates the negative rate of return associated with a bank deposit carrying a negative interest rate. Arbitrage, the 2nd strongest force known to man next to gravity, should operate to keep nominal interest rates above zero. While this logic is compelling, strange things can happen…
The European Central bank has successfully driven short-term European interest rates into negative territory and, moreover, have been able to keep them there despite what must be very strong arbitrage forces. Their reason is to encourage spending rather than saving.
Big institutions don't have big mattresses apparently. They need to park their electronic balances with electronic custody platforms administered by the ECB paying negative electronic interest. The man in the street, on the other hand, does not have this restriction. Can "the little man" benefit from the arbitrage opportunity?
The currency futures market might well deliver this opportunity. Euro USD futures are pricing in a 40 basis point per annum interest rate differential between US and Europe. US T-bills are paying 4 basis points per annum which means the implied European interest rate is -36 basis points. Therefore, anyone with US dollar cash can buy euro, stash it in the matress, sell the future forward and deliver the euro in 3 months time for a 36 basis points per annum gain. Furthermore, those investors who can borrow USD at less than 36bp can simply do this over and over again - a sort of money machine.
While few of us can borrow at the Tbill rate, in practical terms anyone with USD balances are better off holding Euro and selling futures against it since that generates a synthetic USD 'riskless' deposit earning 0.36% versus the alternative of Tbills at 0.04%. While not earth shattering, this is something for nothing.
Ironically, the arbitrage opportunity that the ECB has created encourages investors to stash away cash rather than spend it. This runs directly counter to the aim of negative interest rates which are supposed to encourage spending!
To any student of economics, Singapore is a refreshing example of good policy triumphing over political opportunism. Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's founding father, passed away today and this is his legacy. The economic train wrecks that have become a hallmark of "modern democracy" is what he managed to avoid.
Implementation is always more difficult than theory. To be honest, Mr Lee was not an original thinker - and very few of us can claim such a tag - but he was a politician with a vision who chose the measured long term route over the easier short term one. Singapore's success is that it now commands the highest per capita income of any non-natural resource endowed economy in the world. This is truly a great contribution to Singaporean's individually, and as an example to other legislatures globally.
Being remembered for advancing good policy over potitical expediency should be a common moniker for our political leaders. How hard can this be? Mr Lee is the only leader in recent times who comes to mind who fits this description. Apparently, in politics, this is very hard to achieve.
I have been fascinated by the deluge of commentary linking Quantitative Easing in Europe with declining interest rates in other parts of the world, particularly the United States. The basic argument is that investors are buying US Treasuries to replace European bonds because they have a higher yield. This argument is obviously flawed: the higher yield in US dollars brings with it currency risk and additional volatility, so they are not substitutes. In theory, due to the absence of arbitrage, an investment in US Treasuries, when fully hedged back to Euro, should deliver the same return as a German Bund.
That said, as the Bloomberg grab shows, there does seem to be some relation between QE in Europe and the declining yields in the US. It is still difficult to believe that intelligent investors treat a 2% yield for a 10 year Treasury as a substitute for a 0.2% yield for a 10 year Bund. So what rational explanation can there be for 'QE spillover' effects?
For monetary actions to have real economic effects, they must influence either technology, fiscal arrangements or investors attitude to risk. It is hard to argue that the ECB can influence US production technology by it's actions. Equally, it is unlikely that the US Congress would alter its path for taxes and expenditures in response to Mario Draghi's shopping spree in Frankfurt. Could it be that US bond investors feel slightly more comfortable watching the ECB aggressively buying bonds and assigning a lower risk premium to US bond investments than previously? A cyclical reduction in investor risk aversion may well be what we are witnessing in the US bond markets.
A lower risk premium implies a flatter yield curve in the US. The yield curve there has been unusually steep for many years as the markets have been sceptical of the Fed's commitment to lower interest rates. Observing the ECB's aggressive action may well have convinced the sceptics in the US to step out into longer maturities. This would seem the only rational explanation.
In 2010, when the Greek debt crisis first came to a head, the politicians searched frantically for a scapegoat. "Private sector involvement", or PSI as it became known, was the eventual means by which Greek debt was reduced by restructuring bonds in the hands of the private sector. Publicly held debt in the hands of European governments and official institutions was exempt from the restructuring. European politicians found it easy to extinguish the claims of the private sector since it did not affect their own balance sheets. A clear triumph for the politicians over the bankers.
2015 is different. The great majority of Greek debt is now held by the public sector, so that an easy scapegoat no longer exists. Whereas in 2010 politicians were facing off against bankers, in 2015 we have politicians facing off against politicians. This makes the negotiation much easier, since politicians share the same objectives. Both sides know that electoral backlash needs to be contained - Greek Socialists must be seen to be valiantly fighting the establishment while the creditor nations must be seen to be resisting wealth transfers. Electoral attention spans are short, so both sides know that delay is the key to defusing the issue. Money, in fact, doesn't come into it.
The current crisis will end with a whimper, not a bang. There will be fiery speeches, emergency meetings, 5 AM "landmark" agreements to extend deadlines and eventually a long delay, after which the electorate moves on. No debt reduction for the European creditors and a pyrrhic victory for the Socialists.
And that's it!
"Oh yeah, how long is that going to last?" was my instant reaction on hearing of Kim Kardashian's marriage to Kanya West. KK's shameless self promotion and hunger for media attention virtually sentences to death any attempt at a stable relationship.
"Oh yeah, how long is that going to last?" has also been my instant reaction to the slew of policy statements, reversals, competitive devaluation's, rate cuts, projected rate hikes, official releases and unofficial media leaks, that seem to flood out from the Central Banking community with increasing regularity.
Central Banking at one time was a very disciplined pursuit, where policy rules were implemented with a high degree predictability. Under Greenspan, for instance, the Federal Reserve could be fairly counted upon to gradually raise or lower rates with the business cycle. Almost invariably, the Federal Reserve was "behind the curve", which was a very good place to be, in that the market was accurately anticipating policy.
Not today. The GFC has changed all this to a point where the key to policy is judged by its shock value. The Swiss National bank's abandonment of its Euro peg, during mid-trading session no less, wins the prize for "shock value". Monetary policy has become ineffective for a number of reasons, but this does not argue for actively courting policy uncertainty.
Central bankers would do well to revisit the debate over rules versus discretion in the conduct of monetary policy.
An adherence to free-market principles and a light touch to regulation have been the reasons behind Singapore's phenomenal success. The high taxing redistributive policies of the ailing developed nations were rejected in favour of low taxes. Infrastructure spending rather than welfare spending is the guiding logic behind fiscal policy. Monetary policy has been conducted through the exchange rate supported by a mighty foreign reserves position.
Embracing the invisible hand, however, can bring some unwelcome consequences. Property prices have boomed, as one would expect with high incomes, low taxes and limited land supply. Rising property prices are politically sensitive and so the new breed of Singapore's policy makers (post Lee Kwan Yew) introduced a series of 'cooling measures' from 2009 to 2013 in an attempt to fight the market. Not surprisingly, these measures have done little to make property more affordable - instead the effects have been to stifle capital mobility and drive market liquidity to zero.
So now its January 2015 and suddenly the world economy looks a bit wobbly, the European's have embarked on a QE program, and 'deflation' is the new buzz word. Reacting with a sense of urgency, Singapore's Central Bank decided last week to take steps to weaken the currency further - the SGD has fallen roughly 10% against the Chinese Yuan (see graph) over the last 6 months and an additional 10% decline now seems on the cards...
What does this mean for property prices in Singapore? Investors from the People's Republic of China have been prolific purchasers of Singapore property and now, it seems, property prices have just cheapened 10% in Yuan terms and looks like another 10% price cut is heading their way. On the face of it, Singapore property should be about to take-off as foreign demand responds to the lower exchange rate, in turn pushing up prices.
This is going to present a real challenge to Singapore's new breed. Every time a government tries to fight natural market forces it creates distortions, unintended consequences and ultimately policy failure. What is going to happen?
First and foremost, the primary goal of lowering property prices for Singapore citizens has been lost. Instead, foreigners are the winners since they can buy Singapore property more cheaply. Second, to maintain its international purchasing power, property prices should rise. Third, the draconian constraints on borrowing against property for real investment projects has stifled capital mobility, and this is one cause of the perceived slowdown in Singapore's economic prospects. Ironically, the very policies that were to have led to lower property prices are contributing to the upward price pressure wrought upon them from the exchange rate devaluation!
How should Singapore react to all this? The logical response is to recognise that their interventionist experiment has failed and repeal the investment restrictions. At least this will allow domestic property owners to realise their rightful gains from a weaker exchange rate. Most governments would be unable to make such a radical policy reversal, however Singapore's rulers are an impressive and intelligent group who are able to admit their mistakes and rectify errors. If they don't, then the invisible hand that has delivered 50yrs of success is going to dish out a right royal spanking.
Those of you who read yesterday's post are probably wondering 'what happened?' For those who missed the post, I had conjectured that, as part of the ECB's QE policy, the regional Central Banks in Europe would enter the market in the early hours of Monday's trading, vigorously bid up the price of their longer maturity bonds, and then come off the bid an hour or two later.
The following Bloomberg grab shows Monday's market action in the Spanish and Portuguese 30 year bond markets. Spain is the white line and Portugal is in yellow.
The result: Vindication!
While we had expected the Bank of Spain and Bank of Portugal to appear closer to 8am Europe time (15:00 in the diagram), they both eventually turned up at 9:30am (16:30 in the diagram), and almost in concert pushed their 30yr bond prices up 2% over a period of 45 minutes.
Three questions come to mind.
1. Why did the Central Banks wait until 930am when they could have really shoved the market at 8am? My guess is that the Regional Central Banks trading desks schedule a regular conference call for 8am to plan their day's activity. The Greek election result would have thrown a spanner in the works, and what should have been a 15 min discussion bled over into an hour as they assessed the market response. This is only speculation, of course.
2. Who is selling the long end of the Spanish and Portuguese bond markets? With the ECB's cheque book open these markets are going up, up and away. Bondholders need a pretty good reason to stand in the way of Superman. It just doesn't make any sense to sell.
3. Why doesn't the market just accept that 30yr yields in these markets are heading for 1% and start pricing for that now? This is the Trillion Euro question and sure beats me.
Private investors trading with valuable information go to great lengths to conceal their trades so as minimise their market impact. They try to bunch their trades during periods of high liquidity, they use stealth algorithms which drip-feed orders into the market, and they try to operate quietly under the radar.
Not so the ECB and their trusted band of merry regional Central Banks. Their mission is to maximise their market impact as they spend Euro 1 trillion + on any government securities that they can get their hands on. They don't want best execution...they want the worst price they can find! So stay tuned to the European bond market over the next few months as there is some easy money to be made.
Thursday and Fridays' market action is a lesson in what to expect. First, following President Draghi's announcement of the QE bond buying program, the regional Central Banks' (who are charged with the responsibility to execute the purchase program in their respective bond markets) waited 15 minutes and then placed a 'buy everything' order - no limit. 2:45pm in the European bond markets is not an especially liquid time of the day so the price impact was enormous. Spanish 30yr bonds jumped 5% in the space of 30 minutes. And then there was silence - the bid disappeared - but the bonds held their gains.
Friday morning, however, is the key to making money over the next weeks and months. The European bond market officially starts trading at 8:00am Europe time but, generally speaking, not many traders are actively investing and the main buy-side firms based in London have just fallen out of bed, since its 7am, one hour behind Europe. There couldn't be a better time for a big buyer to maximise their market impact, could there? Sure enough the Bank of Spain hit the market like a neutron bomb. The following Bloomberg grab (15:00 Asia time is 8:00 European time) shows the early morning 'carnavale' in the Spanish long bond which lasted for about two hours and saw the bond rise by over 5% at one stage. And then the bid fell silent. The market subsequently managed to hold most of its gains.
So what should we expect today, Monday January 26 2015? My prediction is another opening feeding frenzy as the Bank of Spain repeats its tactics, as they will on Tuesday, Wednesday and so on and so on. These guys mean business, and the long end of the bond market is where their ability to influence prices is greatest. Once the market wakes up, prices will vault higher.
The message: buy the long end of the European yield curve NOW, especially the peripherals, and stay long. The market's going up.